Beyond Idealism: Democracy and Ethics Reform by Donald J. Maletz & Jerry Herbel
ARPA / March 2000Maletz, Herbel / DEMOCRACY AND ETHICS REFORM
BEYOND IDEALISM
Democracy and Ethics Reform
DONALD J. MALETZ
JERRY HERBEL
University of Oklahoma
The effort to oppose corruption has brought in recent decades a heightened emphasis on ethics, the
establishment of official ethics codes, the creation of the first government agencies explicitly
authorized to enforce ethics, and even the creation of ethics committees in Congress. Dennis
Thompson has taken the lead in advocating and analyzing the increased attention to ethics, and yet
one of his more recent studies draws attention to some “paradoxes” inherent in the pursuit of ethics
in government. We take issue with Thompson’s argument that ethics is in some sense the most
important of all policies. The hope for “ethics in government” may only be satisfied at a very modest
level through the work of the current ethics agencies, the enforcement of ethics in government can
impose important costs on the ethics project itself, and the democratic processes of government may
limit what we should do to constrain the power of self-interest.
Our purpose in this article is to bring together two quite different elements of
the ethics issue and to see what can be learned by considering them jointly. First,
we want to draw attention to the reflections of a leading ethics advocate and
theorist, Dennis Thompson, on some special difficulties in maintaining ethics as
an ongoing governmental project with real effects on the behavior of officials
and the perceptions of the public. Thompson has provided important theoretical
guidance for those who believe that ethics has a serious place in government and
specifically in public administration. Furthermore, he has concerned himself
with the practical implementation of ethics rules and, in a recent study of the
paradoxes of government ethics, has considered what happens when ethics
enforcement programs become standardized and routine. Second, we attempt to
take an overview of the programs for ethics enforcement in the administrative
arms of the federal and state governments and of the Congress. This review
helps to reinforce Thompson’s argument that there is a sort of paradox con-
nected with governmental ethics programs. Third, however, the conclusion of
our argument takes issue with Thompson’s proposed resolution of the paradox
and suggests instead a different way of understanding what recent experience
teaches us about the limits of ethics reform.
AUTHORS’ NOTE: Opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and not the Depart-
ment of Defense or its components.
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Two of Thompson’s articles, both published in Public Administration
Review, define the parameters of the issue we want to address. In the first,
Thompson (1985) challenged those who would deny the importance of adminis-
trative ethics, defending the possibility of ethics in this field against those who
preferred to rely on neutral competence or on an impersonal priority of organiza-
tional structures. This article was a principled defense of the validity of concern
with ethics, working out a careful argument for the legitimacy, practicality, and
even public utility of independent acts of ethical judgment by officials within
modern public organizations. But this very committed plea for a revival of
administrative ethics was followed 7 years later by an article in the same journal
titled “Paradoxes of Government Ethics” (Thompson, 1992). The latter article
still insists, to be sure, on the value of a heightened emphasis on government eth-
ics. Yet, there is a distinct cautionary note sounded by the title, if for no other rea-
son than that it concedes there is a paradox that requires address. In this second
article, Thompson sets out to examine this unanticipated paradox and to rescue
government ethics from charges that the practice of enforcing ethics regulations
may be undermining the ethics project itself.
The paradox of which Thompson writes is certainly not one of open, blatant
ineffectiveness. To the contrary, there has never been a time in our history when
ethics has been a more direct object of governmental activity. Not only do we
now have an official ethics agency in the federal executive branch, but every
state and many cities now maintain agencies or commissions that concern them-
selves with the ethics of officeholders. When Thompson wrote about the para-
doxes in 1992, he reported that the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 had pro-
duced an Office of Government Ethics (OGE) with more than 50 support staff.
Through its liaisons in executive branch agencies, the designated agency ethics
officers, the total number of federal personnel employed on ethics issues full-
time had reached 170, while more than 7,100 had part-time responsibilities. The
main activity of these ethics officers in OGE and the liaisons in the agencies was
“counseling and training on ethics,” which he estimated was provided to be-
tween 400,000 and 600,000 federal officials annually (Thompson, 1992, p. 254).
There has, of course, been modest growth since that time, as we explain below.
The movement seeking to promote ethics in government, in short, has appar-
ently been successful beyond what any idealist might have imagined 50 years
ago.
Yet, despite this apparent success in passing laws and even building agencies,
Thompson sees a “paradox” in the ethics situation today and he is right to do so.
At the heart of the problem is a disjunction between the high expectations guid-
ing the ethics reform movement and a certain trivialization of ethics in the result.
The extensive government counseling and training effort at the federal level is
chiefly devoted to providing instruction about avoiding conflicts of financial
interest. The Ethics in Government Act of 1978 requires that federal officials at a
certain level fill out forms annually about their financial interests and that they
avoid conflicts of interest by refusing all but the most trivial gifts offered to them
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by reason of their position. As a result, ethics issues for many federal officials
threaten to become synonymous with burdensome and repetitious paperwork
and with a climate of small-minded suspicion that seems to presume they are
easily corrupted.
We tend to believe, and Thompson certainly argues, that the demand for more
concern for ethics originates in a high-minded concern to purify public life, a
wish for genuinely disinterested public servants, and a pronounced hostility
toward corruption. But to those who are the object of regular OGE attention, eth-
ics may seem a routine reporting requirement at best and a time-consuming dis-
traction from important policy issues at worst. This, then, is one example of a
paradox of government ethics, to borrow Thompson’s rather strong term; or per-
haps it might be better called an example of the conflicting results coming from
the ethics reform program. The public has demanded more attention to ethics in
government, and both national and state legislatures have responded by institut-
ing programs in pursuit of this goal. The demand has led to public action to cod-
ify, supervise, and enforce standards of ethics on a scale unprecedented in our
prior historical experience. Yet the officials on the receiving end of these efforts
regard them as trivializing, and there seems ample reason to believe these pro-
grams have not succeeded in fostering public confidence in the quality or integ-
rity of public officials (Mackey, 1996).1 This is yet another indicator of results
conflicting with our expectations. To borrow Thompson’s term again, we need
to ask if the paradox of government ethics is one in which our expectations are
unrealistic or one in which the implementation of ethics reform has been defi-
cient. Is it a paradox caused by inadequate understanding of the mission on the
part of those who fall under the ethics rules or on the part of the public at large?
ETHICS IN THE SERVICE OF DEMOCRACY?
After describing a certain disillusionment about ethics within government
circles, Thompson’s “paradoxes” argument attempts to develop a framework for
dealing with it. In essence, he recommends trying to convey to officials in gov-
ernment a perspective on ethics that will explain why they must learn to accom-
modate the procedures about which they complain. Ethics as it pertains to public
life is, he explains, distinct from ethics in personal face-to-face matters. In per-
sonal dealings, we concern ourselves with the expression of moral character and
with attempting to “make people morally better.” Political ethics, on the other
hand, “arises from the need to set standards for impersonal relations among peo-
ple who may never meet, and it seeks only to make public policy better by mak-
ing public officials more accountable” (Thompson, 1992, p. 256).
The rules that we need for guidance in these impersonal relationships cannot
be simple, cannot be derived directly from personal morality, and are not neces-
sarily congruent with the canons of private virtue. Above all, we need to accept
that government ethics is concerned with creating a certain appearance of
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probity. It seeks methods to give the public reassurance that government offi-
cials are not corrupt. The audience for government ethics is a vast public that has
little if any personal connection with the officials who govern and that therefore
lacks firsthand knowledge of character. It is more likely than not to be suspicious
of those who enter the higher offices. Government ethics, Thompson (1992)
argues, aims to foster a belief that
officials are making decisions based on the merits. If citizens have this assurance,
they are less likely to raise questions about the motives of officials, are themselves
more likely to concentrate on the merits of decisions and on the substantive qualifi-
cations of the officials who are making the decisions. (pp. 255-256)
Creating that appearance is essential to building citizen confidence in govern-
ment; it “makes democracy safe for debate on the substance of public policy.”
This view, Thompson concedes, manages to treat ethics not as an end in itself but
as a means toward the healthier functioning of democracy. Ethics in this view
becomes instrumental to larger public concerns, above all to “the strengthening
of the democratic process” (pp. 255-256).
The response that Thompson offers, then, to those in government who find
the ethics procedures annoying or trivial is to suggest they see the larger point
of the effort. They must understand that the cultivation of the right kind of
appearances is the heart of the problem of political ethics. From this point of
view, he can go so far as to say that “appearing to do wrong while doing right is
really doing wrong.” He means that effective democracy can only build civic
confidence by means of focusing sustained attention on the explicit cultivation
of the appearance of fairness and disinterestedness. The purpose of government
programs in support of political ethics should be to foster an awareness that
“the rules of government ethics are an integral part of our democratic process”;
to object to such rules is to “stand in the way of making government more
democratic” (1992, p. 255). Ethics officials should grasp this point as they pur-
sue their duties and should, above all, devote themselves to “education in
democracy”:
The main business of government ethics should be what may be called education in
democracy. Government ethics should be seen as a way of reminding officials that
they are accountable to the public, that they primarily serve not their administra-
tive superiors or even their own consciences but all citizens. (p. 255)
Now Thompson’s proposal is in some ways a constructive response to the
complaints visited on the ethics regulations. And yet there are features of this
argument that are difficult and questionable in their own right. We want to name
three and then examine in the following pages whether some of the conflicting
results of the ethics reform program do not reflect deeper difficulties with pro-
posals for ethics development than Thompson takes into account.
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First, the argument seems to presuppose what it is designed to prove. Thomp-
son supposes that democratic citizens can only trust and respect those officials
who commit themselves enthusiastically to ethics. He assumes that we look up
only to those with clean hands and irreproachable paperwork and that our con-
cern for the appearance of probity in this sense matters more than other factors in
shaping our judgment of officials. But is this the case? Do we know that the
prime instigator of civic confidence is the appearance of propriety rather than
other factors that citizens might take into account, such as political connections,
loyalty based on past service to a party or interest group, charisma, personal
background (national, religious, linguistic, gender), or even managerial compe-
tence? Do we know that creating the appearance of public virtue is a high prior-
ity for those who care about the democratic process? Thompson’s argument
appears to presuppose that ethics is the first priority of democratic citizens and
that inadequate attention to ethics hinders policy making. He then fashions a
defense of the ethics movement on the basis of that assumption. Yet there are a
number of factors that might bring into question this presupposition, perhaps
above all the fact that the choice of persons for public office often does not seem
to turn on questions of ethics (Malec, 1993, pp. 22-26).2
Second, Thompson asserts that his “appearance standard expresses princi-
ples that are at the heart of our Constitution” (1992, p. 257). This seems a highly
contestable understanding of the Constitution. That estimable document cer-
tainly contains nothing like a reference to political ethics in the sense that
Thompson describes. What appears to be at the heart of the Constitution might
rather be the separation of powers, concern for the rule of law, the interest in pro-
tecting private rights and liberties, the expectation of a genuinely republican
political life, and so forth. These core elements of constitutionalism will cer-
tainly authorize exposure and punishment of violations of the law, and the lan-
guage of the document takes note of possible high crimes and misdemeanors
that justify impeachment even of the highest official. Yet, there is nothing in the
Constitution explicitly authorizing any program of ethics training, indoctrina-
tion, or education; there are no references to requirements of good moral charac-
ter as a prerequisite for public office; there is no provision for an office of ethics
or the creation of institutional mechanisms for fostering ethics. It would be hard
to show that the founders ever entertained the notion that the constitutional gov-
ernment they designed would be remarkable for its ethical purity.3 A spirit of
realism seems to be closer to the mark. We must concede, argued James Madison
in The Federalist No. 10 (Wills, 1982), that “enlightened statesmen will not
always be at the helm,” and we should recognize that “neither moral nor relig-
ious motives can be relied on as an adequate control”; and he began a famous
argument in The Federalist No. 51 with “if men were angels” (Wills, 1982) and
proceeded to show that they are not and must never be assumed to be so.4
Third, it seems clear that Thompson’s thesis about democracy makes empiri-
cal claims that invite an examination they have not yet received. He maintains
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that democracy works best and most effectively earns citizen confidence when
its officials maintain appearances in the sense he proposes. “To reject the
appearance standard is to reject the possibility of democratic accountability”
(1992, p. 257). Yet do we know that the appearance standard is essential to
democratic accountability? Do we know that the high-minded approach at the
root of the ethics movement is in fact productive of a better democratic process?
Some have seen the sustaining of the appearance of propriety as a means to reas-
sure voters who otherwise lack specific information about the exact motives and
agendas of officials; others insist that self-interested behavior and an ethic of
reciprocity, bargaining, and deal making is the essential lubricant of the real
world of democracy. Thompson presumes the former approach is superior, but
does not engage the advocates of the latter view.5
In the following pages, we wish to explore these questions more carefully. We
provide an overview of the efforts that have been made in the past several dec-
ades to clarify the rules of political ethics and above all to enforce these rules.
We review the operations of the federal OGE and examine the scope of ethics
reform and enforcement in state and local government and in the internal opera-
tions of Congress. Our survey will summarize what increasingly seems like a
mobilization of significant national resources on behalf of political ethics. Fol-
lowing Thompson’s lead, we will ask in each of the following areas: To what
extent does this effort produce an enhancement of the democratic process or
even a perception of the enhancement of the democratic process? Are there costs
as well as benefits to this endeavor? Are the results generally positive in all areas
of governmental activity, or is success more likely in some areas than in others?
THE OFFICE OF GOVERNMENT ETHICS
The federal OGE came into being with the passage of the Ethics in Govern-
ment Act in 1978. Originally a component of the Office of Personnel Manage-
ment, it gained independent status with the Ethics Reform Act of 1989.
Although not an enforcement agency (it refers possible violations of law to the
Justice Department), it provides direction and leadership in matters of ethics
within the executive branch alone, having been given no authority to deal with
the legislature or the judiciary. Its functions and reach tend to be widening. Its
annual budget has grown to $8.1 million for fiscal year 1997, and its staff to 84
full-time equivalent for the same fiscal year. OGE’s rules and procedures have
been more thoroughly refined; it now maintains an extensive information and
publishing program (including a relatively elaborate web site),6 is increasingly
consulted by professional bodies, and has even begun to play a role in advising
foreign governments, particularly of the emerging democracies, about anticor-
ruption programs (OGE, 1998). As it developed its programs, it has required
each federal agency to have a designated agency ethics officer responsible for
administering the ethics record-keeping paperwork and for conducting regular
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training for employees. Agency training programs are regularly reviewed and
evaluated. In 1989, OGE was charged to devise a “single, comprehensive, and
clear set of executive branch standards of conduct that shall be objective, reason-
able, and enforceable.” This mandate led to the “Fourteen Principles of Ethical
Conduct for Federal Employees,” issued in 1993 (Office of Government Ethics,
1994, pp. 9-10).7 OGE began sponsoring annual conferences in 1991 and, in
1994, sponsored an “International Conference on Ethics in Government,” draw-
ing participants from 49 countries and anticipating the initiation of a worldwide
ethics community. Judging from the range of activities, it would seem that the
call for ethics in government has produced some definite results.
Yet, when we examine the activities of this agency, we can see that its actual
range of operations is far more limited than its title might seem to indicate. The
legislation authorizing it has a grand title (the Ethics in Government Act8), but
the duties of the agency are quite restricted in scope, to the extent that one may
doubt whether it is possible for it to engage in the building of a program of edu-
cation in democracy. For all practical purposes, its mission as actually designed
by the Congress is essentially one of attempting to limit conflicts of financial
interest. It is useful to differentiate between “compliance ethics” and “integrity
ethics” (Hejka-Ekins, 1994, pp. 65-66). The former approach emphasizes the
promulgation of detailed rules and regulations and the aggressive pursuit of
thorough, consistent compliance. Integrity ethics is oriented toward developing
a clear sense of models to imitate, cultivating processes of moral reasoning
applicable in complex situations, and fostering an ambition for high standards.
It is clear that OGE has been structured to be a compliance agency; its role is
effectively limited to the pursuit of compliance with the rules about financial
disclosure and conflicts of interest.
Thus, when we take a closer look at the actual functions of OGE, we see they
are primarily devoted to tracking financial connections.9 When someone is
appointed, the ethics rules require detailed analysis of the candidate’s financial
position and relationships. Postemployment opportunities are carefully
restricted under the law so that officials are not tempted to structure their deci-
sions to gain an advantage in their career after government service. Furthermore,
reporting on personal finances becomes an ongoing process. OGE requires a sig-
nificant number of high-level officials to fill out on an annual basis a Standard
Form (SF) 278 Executive Branch Public Financial Disclosure Form.10 These
forms solicit highly specific information, which is made publicly available on
formal written request. All persons nominated by the president for positions
requiring Senate confirmation must file the public financial disclosure reports,
and usually these reports must be reviewed and approved before the Senate con-
firmation hearings. In 1996, 138 such reports were reviewed by OGE; in 1997,
the number rose to 323; the number has been as high as 415 in 1994 (OGE,
1998). Many others at lower levels are required to fill out annually the SF 450
Confidential Financial Disclosure Report. Although this information is not dis-
closed publicly, these reports are scrutinized for conflicts.
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The purpose of collecting such voluminous data is to produce a picture of an
“interrelated whole” that describes “an employee’s outside linkages” and in so
doing to “reveal actual and potential conflicts of interest” (OGE, 1996, pp. 3-1,
5-1) The result is an analysis that has consequences. Employees may be for-
mally required to divest themselves of significant holdings, put their funds into
blind trusts, agree to recusals in certain areas of responsibility, or resign from
other positions in external organizations. Of the 323 presidential nominees in
1997, for example, about half (157) were required to enter into formal ethics
agreements because of a real or potential conflict of interest. All of the financial
disclosure forms, both public and confidential, are reviewed either within the
employee’s agency or by OGE or in some cases by both to identify problems and
specify corrective action. Whereas the OGE reports an education and training
mission, the theme of the education and training is only to expand understanding
of the conflict-of-interest regulations. In a summary of the role of OGE, the pur-
pose is stated by the agency in terms that fit with Thompson’s (1992) thesis and
that use integrity language:
The purpose of the “ethics in government” program is to ensure that executive
branch decisions are neither tainted by nor appear to be tainted by any question of
conflicts of interest on the part of the employees involved in the decisions. Because
the integrity of decision-making is fundamental to every Government program, the
head of each agency has primary responsibility for the day-to-day administration
of the “ethics in government” program for the employees who carry out the sub-
stantive programs of that agency. (OGE, 1996, p. 8)
Yet, the reader who puts this statement into the context of OGE’s actual range
of activities cannot help but be struck by several kinds of severe limitations in it.
First of all, although the word integrity appears, its meaning here is in actual
practice limited to a kind of financial disinterestedness and incorruptibility or to
creating the appearance of these qualities. This no doubt reflects the fact that
financial temptations are very common, constituting perhaps the most powerful
inducements to misbehavior on the part of government employees or any other
persons. Yet the issue of integrity surely has something to do with other dimen-
sions of performance and character: honesty and truthfulness in dealing with
others, competence, freedom from inappropriate political entanglements, pro-
fessionalism, loyalty to the major purposes of the political order, respect for
institutions, and so forth. We would not deny that developing the habit of report-
ing one’s financial interests will have a clarifying effect in making officials more
aware of the responsibilities of their position. In that respect, such a habit will
contribute to a heightened awareness of public expectations connected with gov-
ernment service. Yet the other dimensions of integrity need systematic cultiva-
tion, and there is nothing in the OGE mission enabling it to concern itself with
these other, perhaps more important, aspects of behavior. In effect, the relentless
pursuit of financial clarity may well serve to reduce employee awareness of
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ethics to this issue alone, for this issue is the only one made the constant and reit-
erated object of organizational attention under the rubric of ethics.
The restricted nature of the actual mission can be nicely illustrated by a book-
let published by OGE in 1993. Glossy and professional in appearance, the book-
let offers an overview of ethics guidelines for federal employees. It is titled Take
the High Road. The sole theme, however, is financial matters: gifts from outside
sources, gifts between employees, conflicting financial interests, issues of parti-
ality to outside organizations in which one has an interest, postemployment
issues, misuse of position for private gain, and inappropriate outside activities
while in government employment. Although addressed in a booklet about the
high road, these issues appear to be exactly the stuff of what Rohr has called with
some reason the “low road” approach to ethics: concentrating on the most com-
mon form of misbehavior to surround these very ordinary temptations with regu-
lations and constraints. The low road is, he contends, one that “addresses ethical
issues almost exclusively in terms of adherence to agency rules.” “Ethical
behavior is reduced to staying out of trouble,” and he warns of the danger of
“pharisaism” on the part of those dealing with such rules and attempting to work
them out with ever more rigor and detail (Rohr, 1989, pp. 8-9, 60-64). There is in
the low-road approach no provision for stimulating aspiration or even reflection
about the highest levels of administrative performance in public service, levels
where a public official might begin to aspire to genuine distinction or excellence
in performance.11
Second, the OGE statement of its role appears to assume without question
that freedom from financial conflicts of interest is fundamental to the perform-
ance of an agency. The assertion has a rhetorical plausibility, but is it in fact
credible? If the incorruptibility of employees is truly fundamental, it might then
be argued that guarding against corruption ought to be the first priority of an
organization. Yet a bit of reflection suggests that it is seldom the first priority.
Public organizations have primary substantive missions. There is little doubt
that corruption can damage the performance of the mission, but at the same time,
there seems little doubt that organizations generally subordinate the elimination
of corruption to some or maybe many other tasks that are their actual raison
d’être. Freedom from conflict of interest and other forms of inappropriate entan-
glement or outright corruption can be quite helpful to the operations of an
agency and building public confidence in it. But it is hard to see why the achieve-
ment of complete disentanglement from inappropriate interests is necessarily
more fundamental than other elements of its activity, above all progress toward
achieving its substantive mission. In actual practice, of course, ethics matters
are usually treated more like a necessary but peripheral issue of record keeping
than a matter of fundamental importance. There may be temporary disruptions
of this orientation, especially when a scandal arises to occupy public attention.
But these tend to be unusual and idiosyncratic moments, not the defining condi-
tions for agency effectiveness in the eyes of citizens.
Maletz, Herbel / DEMOCRACY AND ETHICS REFORM 27
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016arp.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
From this brief survey of the first federal office devoted explicitly to ethics, it
would be fair to conclude that ethics in government is in fact something consid-
erably less than a program of education in democracy. It is a modest attempt to
bring the financial interests of public officials under scrutiny and to regulate
them more closely than in the past.
THE ETHICS PROJECT IN THE STATES
The individual states, similar to the national government, felt the impetus of
new public demands for ethics in government in the 1960s and 1970s. The devel-
opment of more stringent ethics rules and the creation of stronger agencies or
commissions in the states even arose independently in some states, not as an imi-
tation of federal legislation such as the Ethics in Government Act of 1978. The
first ethics commissions were established in the states of Texas and Ohio in
1965. Hejka-Ekins (1994) reports that all 50 states now maintain some form of
ethics agency or commission, with the last in her calculation to create such an
entity being Arkansas in 1988.12 A survey of the states by Menzel (1996) led him
to conclude that 36 states had an ethics agency or commission at the time of his
inquiry in 1996. His different total appears to reflect a judgment about the
strength or authority of such organizations; he sees “about a dozen” states with
comprehensive laws and reasonably powerful commissions and a number of
other states with ethics commissions possessing “little or no authority” (includ-
ing in that category Arkansas, Texas, Utah, and Vermont). Menzel also notes
that ethics commissions are found in some larger cities, including particularly
Los Angeles, New York, and Chicago.13 Ensign (1996) reports that there were 39
new state ethics commissions or agencies created in the years from 1973 to
1978; thereafter, there were 8 more created in 1979 to 1988 and 12 from 1989 to
1993. His count must include measures that revise or reform previously existing
entities because the total adds up to more than 50.
It is abundantly clear that the demand for ethics reform has affected state and
local as well as the national government. However, obtaining a clear picture of
the scale of state and local efforts and of their successes and failures is far from
easy. There is no single source drawing together complete information about
state and local ethics legislation and agencies, and there are relatively few
detailed studies of the operations of specific agencies or of the laws that they
enforce (Bullock, 1993).14 This fact is, of course, not too surprising, given the
diversity of governmental entities to be canvassed and the fact that ethics com-
missions or agencies with significant powers are relatively new.
The best information developed to date about state efforts indicates that there
is a great diversity in the scope of ethics regulations and an equally great diver-
sity in the authority and effectiveness of ethics agencies. Some ethics laws are
minimal in scope with many loopholes, whereas others are tighter; some agen-
cies appear to have been kept relatively toothless, whereas others are equipped
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with sufficient powers, staff, and budget to perform with reasonable effective-
ness. An additional complexity lies in the fact that many state ethics agencies
appear to combine three or four tasks that are distinctly separated at the national
level. The federal OGE has jurisdiction only over executive branch personnel
and therefore has no authority to supervise legislators, legislative staff, or mem-
bers of the judiciary. Furthermore, it is not empowered to deal with campaign
finance and election issues. Last, it has nothing to do with registering or super-
vising lobbyists. At the state level, by contrast, many ethics commissions or
agencies enforce conflict of interest regulations over executive and legislative
personnel, keep track of campaign fund-raising and expenditures while trying to
enforce rules limiting donors, and register and supervise lobbyists. At the state
level, in short, agencies often combine roles assigned separately to the federal
OGE, to the Federal Election Commission, to the Ethics Committees of Con-
gress, and to the Clerk of the House and Secretary of the Senate who register
lobbyists.
Despite these difficulties, there are some important lessons one can learn
from looking at the work of the state commissions, precisely in terms of their
ability to contribute to the larger goal that Thompson (1992) indicates—that of
furthering the democratic process.
The state agencies, similar to the federal OGE, usually establish rules
designed to prohibit conflicts of financial interest. As previously noted, the state
commissions also must frequently track campaign and election expenditures,
register lobbyists, and receive reports on lobbying expenditures. The Texas
Commission is even empowered to issue recommendations on the salaries and
per diem rates for major offices of state government.15 Some of the state agen-
cies are kept very dependent on the legislature and, for that reason, are often
weak. An interesting case is that of Kentucky. Mackey (1996) recently examined
an ethics reform passed by the Kentucky legislature in 1993 in response to a
major scandal. Because the scandal involved legislative corruption, the legisla-
tion established an independent ethics commission within the legislative branch
charged specifically with overseeing legislative behavior and investigating
charges of unethical conduct. Mackey praises this measure as a strong one and
recommends that it serve as a model for other states, both because of its general
effectiveness and because its placement within the legislative branch helps to
safeguard legislative independence. Yet the editor of the Public Integrity
Annual, in which this article appeared, felt obliged to insert an editor’s note
reporting that in 1996 the legislature significantly weakened the commission
(Mackey, 1996, p. 62). Strategies of this kind are not unknown elsewhere. Partly
as a reaction to such maneuvers, some states (e.g., Oklahoma and Texas) have
ethics commissions, which were created by a process of constitutional amend-
ment (Maletz & Herbel, 1998). In such cases, the agency obtains an independent
stature and permanence from its constitutional status. Yet, even constitutionally
established commissions can be severely undermined if denied rule-making or
enforcement power, deprived of sufficient budget to carry on investigative
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activities, or dominated by appointees with strong loyalties to local satraps
rather than to good government idealism.
There are relatively few studies of the performance of these agencies. Hejka-
Ekins, who has looked at their in-service training, finds that they generally con-
form to the pattern of the federal office by emphasizing compliance with rules
and regulations designed to inhibit conflicts of interest. But she has made note of
a few instances in which more serious kinds of training are attempted, and
argues that occasional efforts to implement a more integrated blend of compli-
ance and integrity training, as in the state of Illinois, are “germinal and sporadic
but persistent and creative in nature” (Hejka-Ekins, 1994, pp. 73-75). The Flor-
ida Commission on Ethics has been the subject of two detailed analyses. After a
thorough review of the agency’s performance in terms of four main functions,
Russell L. Williams contends that the Florida Commission on Ethics tends to be
weakest in the area of training, and what efforts it does make to provide educa-
tion or training are limited to a “reactive, legalistic approach.” He reports, fur-
thermore, a complaint of a former ethics commissioner who thinks the agency is
vulnerable to being used as “a political weapon in state and county elections.”
The weapon is, of course, the strategy of filing ethics complaints in the waning
days of a campaign, when voters are likely to hear the report of an ethics allega-
tion in the media and are less likely to concern themselves with its substance or
validity. On the whole, Williams concludes that the Florida ethics commission
has “adapted to its environment rather than adapting the environment to it.” It
has some effect as a “punitive agent” but little effect as “an agent of constructive
change” (Williams, 1996, pp. 67-71). Donald Menzel has examined the same
agency’s ability to respond to complaints. He concludes that the Florida com-
mission is widely believed to be ineffective and may even be “widening rather
than closing the trust deficit” because although “many complaints are filed,” “few
are judged violations of ethics laws” by the commission (1996, pp. 75-76).
One study attempting a broad overview of state ethics laws was conducted by
Goodman, Holp, and Ludwig (1996). Among other interesting features, their
work offers a classification of state ethics legislation in terms of overall strength
and comprehensiveness. They were able to collect data on ethics rules from 41
states, and concluded that only in 4 cases were they willing to evaluate the
strength of ethics rules as high. Eleven states were classified as low on this scale,
15 were moderate, and 6 were moderately high. Perhaps the most interesting
result of their study, however, resulted from the attempt to measure whether
there was a significant correlation between the type of political culture in a given
state and the strength of the ethics rules. They found that there was not. They
concluded that the development and intensification of ethics legislation was
mainly driven by “the media and public opinion” and that “ethics policy is being
developed in a reactive mode driven by legislative scandals” (Goodman et al.,
1996, p. 55). From this finding, we might draw the skeptical conclusion that
much ethics activity in states and cities is due to a public reaction to a sudden
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exposure of examples of corruption. When that happens, the public demands
that something be done, and the passage of new laws or the creation of a new
agency is often the result. Yet when public reaction cools, the pressure for
reform often evaporates as well. The authors of this study do not think we can
conclude that any of the states have created a truly anticorruption political cul-
ture on which a new era of good government can be built (Goodman et al., 1996).
Curiously, the most intensive study of a state’s attempt at ethics regulation is
to be found in a book by two critics of the ethics movement. Anechiarico and
Jacobs (1996) have described in great detail the anticorruption project, as they
call the quest for ethics in government, in the city of New York. Taking a quite
critical view of the effort to enforce ethics, they have developed a rich historical
and analytical account of efforts in the state of New York during the past century
to put an effective lid on corruption. They are able to show that elaborate investi-
gations into governmental corruption and well-intentioned designs to reduce or
eliminate corrupt activity go well back into the 19th century. It is doubtful that
the history of any other state is as replete with efforts at reform, with prestigious
investigative commissions, and with organizational and legal innovation as New
York. In this account, however, it continues to be the case that these efforts are
almost entirely legal and punitive in character. They aim at ferreting out corrup-
tion on the part of municipal personnel. Nevertheless, Anechiarico and Jacobs
conclude that it is impossible to measure whether such undertakings have in fact
reduced corruption, and in a point to which we shall return, they offer a signifi-
cant argument that the administrative processes of government have been dam-
aged not only by corruption but by the anticorruption initiatives themselves.
The state ethics agencies, similar to the federal, doubtless contribute some-
thing useful to the democratic process. It seems reasonable to expect that efforts
to reduce corruption may enhance citizens’ respect for and confidence in gov-
ernment—although this point remains a likelihood rather than a conclusion
backed up by empirical evidence. Yet, what we can at this stage learn about the
ethics effort in the states again suggests that it suffers from the same limitations
as the federal effort. The name and the professed missions of the various state
boards and agencies suggest a more elevated role than they are as yet equipped to
perform. The real activity of these entities appears to be severely restricted in
scope to several perhaps necessary but uninspiring tasks: record keeping on mat-
ters of financial conflicts of interest, tracking campaign and election expendi-
tures, registering lobbyists, and a few other related duties. On the whole, it
would also appear that state ethics agencies are bedeviled more severely than the
federal OGE by serious weakness in the ability to enforce the regulations that
exist and then to punish violators. They are frequently poorly financed and
understaffed. Nevertheless, the enforcement problem aside, the deeper issue
seems to be again that these agencies have it in their power to do very little to
make democracy work better in any large respect or to inculcate in public offi-
cials an aspiration to become deeply educated in democracy.
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ETHICS IN CONGRESS
The legislative branch of government is the other venue for an appreciably
enhanced attention to ethics in recent decades. Not only is the U.S. Congress
covered by the financial disclosure provisions of the Ethics in Government Act,
but it merits our attention because it has drawn the scrutiny of Thompson (1995)
in a recent book devoted specifically to the topic of legislative ethics titled Eth-
ics in Congress: From Individual to Institutional Corruption. Thompson here
explores another seeming paradox in government ethics. Although more mem-
bers of Congress have been investigated and sanctioned in some way in the past
20 years “than in the entire previous history of the institution,” members of Con-
gress individually are, he holds, less corrupt now than ever before, because what
was once considered normal conduct for elected members is now illegal. Yet, at
the same time, the proliferation of laws, rules of conduct, investigations, and
ethics committees has been accompanied by a widespread perception of per-
sonal and institutional corruption. We have already quoted Norman Ornstein to
the effect that an “overwhelming majority of Americans” see politics, and espe-
cially Congress, as “morally bankrupt in a fashion worse than at any time in
recent memory” (Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996, p. 9). Thompson (1995) agrees
that views such as this reflect widespread public attitudes (p. 1; see also Con-
gressional Quarterly, 1992, pp. 159-161).16
The Constitution gave Congress wide latitude in establishing its own rules of
conduct, permitting the creation of unique rules and procedures. During the first
170 years of its existence, Congress operated with ad hoc rules of behavior.17 If
forced by public pressure, it would act against a member, but sometimes it
resisted taking action until a criminal investigation by the Justice Department
was already underway. Usually, press accounts prompted action. The history of
congressional discipline can be roughly divided into the pre- and postreform
periods, with the Ethics in Government Act as the dividing line between the two.
Thompson (1995) sums up the activity of Congress in these two periods as
follows:
From 1789 through 1977 (the year before the Ethics in Government Act) Congress
took official notice of charges of ethics violations involving fifty-three members,
of whom twenty-one received sanctions from either a committee or the full body,
eleven resigned and two served prison terms. From 1978 through 1992 Congress
considered charges involving sixty-three members; thirty-one were sanctioned or
convicted and sixteen resigned or announced their intention to retire. In the Senate
alone the total since 1978 has been lower than it was in the earlier period, although
the annual rate of cases has been much higher (1.1 compared to 0.15). (1995, p. 191)
In recent efforts to come to grips with corruption, both houses of Congress
have passed explicit ethics rules, constructed permanent ethics committees to
interpret them, and given these committees formidable investigatory and
enforcement power. Until 1958, there were no official, formal rules of conduct
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for Congress members. In that year, reaction to a scandal surrounding President
Eisenhower’s chief of staff Sherman Adams led to passage by both houses of a
Code of Ethics (Congressional Quarterly, 1992, p. 146). The code applied to all
government employees and, using rather general language, exhorted them to put
the highest moral principles above any loyalties to people, government depart-
ment, or political parties. But the code had no legal force. The Senate adopted
tougher, enforceable standards of conduct in 1964 as part of the investigation of
Bobby Baker. This investigation by the Senate Rules and Administration Com-
mittee culminated in the adoption of rules regulating the conditions under which
campaign funds could be raised and the uses to which they could be put, and lim-
ited solicitation or distribution of campaign funds to a few Senate employees
and required the filing of confidential financial information with the U.S. comp-
troller general. House rules became formalized with the passage of the Code of
Conduct in 1968 following the highly publicized investigation and attempted
exclusion from Congress of Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. (Congressional Quar-
terly, 1992, pp. 145-147).
Both chambers have established permanent ethics committees in the past 30
years. The Senate established in 1964 the Select Committee on Standards and
Conduct, which was renamed the Select Committee on Ethics in 1977. In 1967,
the House established the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct. Assign-
ment to these committees today is generally regarded as quite onerous duty, and
few members volunteer for it. Part of the reason for this reluctance is that mem-
bers are often required to put party loyalty aside in judging the actions of their
friends and colleagues. They stand to gain little political or electoral benefit in
doing so.
The explicitly political character of many congressional ethics issues calls
for special consideration in the makeup of the ethics committees. The need to
review potentially explosive information and the need for authoritativeness in
recommending punishments dictates a requirement for the appearance of strict
neutrality. As a result, the ethics committees are the only permanent committees
with equal representation from both parties. The members selected are generally
regarded as holding moderate views and are normally perceived to be less parti-
san than their peers. In fact, these committees deliberate in what is often
regarded as the most neutral forum of any congressional committee. This fact is
further reinforced by the secrecy within which these committees are permitted
to work; they are not required, for example, to hold public hearings on any aspect
of their investigations or deliberations. Only when cases become highly publi-
cized, as in the case of the Keating Five, do partisan loyalties of committee mem-
bers seem to taint their judgments. Thompson (1995, p. 148) predicts such pub-
licity may well drive ethics committees to greater partisanship in future years.
Whether these committees will indeed follow the trend of rising partisanship in
Congress remains to be seen. But if they do, ethics investigations and judgments
are likely to be increasingly relegated to the category of political instruments.
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Ethics committees follow few specific rules outside the dictates of the Ethics
in Government Act and the Ethics Reform Act of 1989. In their routine duties,
the ethics committees oversee such statutory requirements as financial disclo-
sure, conflict of interest, gifts, travel reimbursement, and outside income. But
because these issues are seldom the sole basis of an ethics complaint, committee
work often focuses on charges of corruption brought by other members or occa-
sionally by the press. The inflammatory nature of such charges, independent of a
finding of actual corruption, can and often does damage personal reputations in
spite of eventual vindication. Both houses now require that members bringing a
charge swear to its truth, and House members are required to try to get three
other members to sign the statement as well. Still, many of the complaints
brought against members are for actions outside the statutory guidelines that fall
under very broad chamber standards. House members’ conduct “shall reflect
creditably on the House,” and Senate members can be charged for “improper
conduct which may reflect upon the Senate” (Thompson, 1995, pp. 151-153).
These broad, catchall phrases reflect the importance of the appearance of ethical
behavior and seem to make no clear distinction between personal conduct and
conduct that reflects on institutional processes. Thus, congressional standards
of ethics permit committees wide latitude not only in interpreting and enforcing
the law but also in upholding the integrity of the institution.
Recent reform, especially as embodied in the Ethics Reform Act, centers on
financial disclosure.18 These reports of assets and income, seen as intrusive and
trivial by many members, are assumed to have a positive effect on congressional
ethics by improving the appearance of individual behavior. It is Thompson’s
belief that throwing light on members’ financial interests also throws light on
their motives. But disclosure alone may not be an effective way to shore up flag-
ging public perceptions of Congress. First, if voters are troubled by what is dis-
closed, they can act decisively on only 1 of 435 members—their own. Second,
the reputation of the institution is disproportionately shaped by the deeds of a
few members and the reactions of their constituents. Greater reporting require-
ments may only occasionally eliminate conflicts of interest, whereas sensa-
tional reports of the corrupt few continue to dominate the news. Again, the pub-
lic is often not sure which to trust—either news reports of improper conduct or
explanations put forward by their representatives. Finally, disclosure forms do
not list assets or income in a form familiar to most voters, making them confus-
ing documents at best. Of course, only a tiny minority of voters see them at all.
And because they are not audited, they usually only come up in public debate as
part of a wider investigation, making a judgment of financial malfeasance by
itself difficult.
But even if disclosure reports were more readily available and the other ethics
rules were clearer, would voters turn out of office those implicated in question-
able behavior? Does disclosure, in other words, improve electoral accountabil-
ity? Thompson suggests this would not necessarily be the most common result.
Between 1978 and 1982, 39% of members sanctioned in some way were defeated
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in reelection or retired, compared to 17% of all members (pp. 140-141). An ear-
lier study of the effects of charges of corruption on voting behavior found that
the charges cost 6% to 11% of the vote and that 75% of those charged who made
it to the general election won (Peters & Welch, 1980, p. 702). Of course, voters
reach their decisions for many reasons, and ethics may not even be the primary
one. So long as disclosure remains the primary method of policing behavior, lit-
tle systematic improvement seems likely.
The rapid decline in the public’s perception of congressional ethics almost
perfectly coincided with the congressional ethics reform movement. Thompson
makes the point that the appearance of so many ethics laws, committees, and
investigations may have fueled this trend. He notes that there have been 49 cases
of individual corruption in Congress since 1977 for types of misconduct includ-
ing bribery, conflicts of interest, racketeering, extortion, drug use, sexual mis-
conduct, and perjury (pp. 184-190).19 It is hard to avoid the suspicion that the
appearance created by numerous investigations is highly influential in shaping
the public’s opinion of Congress, even if the new regulations have in fact suc-
ceeded in reducing the actual incidence of outright corruption. It is often said
that ethics must be concerned with forestalling not only wrongdoing but even
the appearance of wrongdoing. Yet in the world of contemporary democracy,
there may be a sense in which the appearances created by disclosing wrongdoing
exact some unexpected costs of their own in terms of perceived institutional
legitimacy. Ethics investigations may offer partisans some new political weap-
ons, but their contribution to the democratic process is often difficult to discern.
SOME COSTS OF ETHICS REFORM
The concern for ethics in government is an old story in the United States; it is
likely as old as its evil twin, corruption. The actions taken to address that con-
cern have become more vigorous in the past several decades, and the creation of
laws and institutions to act on matters of ethics could well lead observers to hope
for an overall improvement in the ethical quality of public service. The work of
Thompson seems to speak for this new invigoration of ethics in government. His
early statement on the theme in “The Possibility of Administrative Ethics”
(1985) sought to recommend the notion of an engaged, conscientious public ser-
vant ready and willing to activate his conscience on matters of policy. This offi-
cial would consciously repudiate the ethic of neutrality recommended to admin-
istrators of an earlier day and would approach his or her duties expecting to be
held accountable by a critical public demanding high levels of moral responsi-
bility. As he noted 7 years later in “The Paradoxes of Government Ethics”
(1992), these conscientious and responsible officials are now under the report-
ing requirements of an official ethics in government act. Their ambition to act
well is reinforced by a routine of paperwork designed to ferret out indicators of
corruption. To their complaints he replies that such are the costs of taking ethics
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seriously and that these costs serve a greater goal, enhancement of the demo-
cratic process. That goal is more elevated than the mere recommendation to
avoid the possibly amoral neutrality that formerly was taught to administrators.
It recommends to officials a vision of a governmental process that is carried on
by incorruptible persons who are content to document their interests for others
to guard against the reality or the appearance of temptation. This goal goes
beyond merely activating the conscience of administrators. It aims at a more
abstract and also more ambitious target: raising the democratic processes of
government to a higher level. If practiced, it might help to heal damaged institu-
tions, as he shows in his study of congressional ethics.
The paradox of government ethics is best stated by Thompson (1992) in this
fashion: “Because other issues are more important than ethics, ethics is more
important than any issue” (p. 255). In this formulation, it is literally a paradox. If
taken less literally, is it also an overstatement that should be rejected? Thomp-
son’s point means essentially that the task of addressing the most urgent policy
problems requires as a prerequisite measures guaranteeing disinterestedness
and noncorruption. Citizens do not normally rank ethics as the first of their con-
cerns, but they do want policy decisions to be made on the merits. They will only
think they are made on the merits if they trust the motives of those who make
them. The real purpose of government ethics reform is, then, to establish confi-
dence in the motives of those who govern and thus to produce a new purity of the
governing process. A hope for this kind of reassurance doubtless contributes to
the wave of ethics reforms across the nation that we have just documented. But
would those who want these reforms go so far as to claim that “ethics is more
important than any issue”?
The ethics reform movement has many attractive features, and it may well
have produced some real, if modest, improvements in the behavior of public
officials. Yet it is a far more ambiguous phenomenon than Thompson’s argu-
ment indicates, and there seem to be grounds for fearing that it may cause some
significant damage to the processes of democracy as well as benefits. The diffi-
culties lie in three different areas, as follows:
1. The ethics reform measures are in fact, at their best, essentially devices for trying
to inhibit and expose conflicts of financial interest and have little effect in estab-
lishing the higher components of ethics that proponents desire.
2. There is some evidence that the pursuit of strong limits on corruption may directly
or indirectly constrain administrators in other aspects of their role that are essen-
tial to effective public management.
3. The goal of creating a corps of public officials who are free of all entangling per-
sonal interests and therefore genuinely disinterested (at least in their official
capacity) may be in conflict with some important expectations about how gov-
ernance in a democracy must work, especially in its representing aspects.
Let us address each of these points more fully.
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THE LIMITED SCOPE OF ETHICS ENFORCEMENT
First, the ethics reform movement, as we have seen, inevitably creates high
expectations. And yet these expectations cannot be fulfilled by the kinds of
efforts yet undertaken or foreseeable in the future if the ethics legislation is sus-
tained and developed. Ethics is a word of some breadth of meaning. It suggests
the basic components of honesty, decency, truthfulness, law-abidingness,
uprightness, and similar qualities. It also suggests higher and more comprehen-
sive levels of virtue, excellence of character, and distinction of mind, qualities
sometimes captured in broad terms such as integrity. Yet, the real world of gov-
ernment ethics action seems to be relentlessly directed toward the simpler ele-
ments of ethics. Ethics legislation today is almost entirely devoted to attacks on
corruption. It aims to prevent, not to inspire. The ethics laws are directed toward
specifying what is prohibited and merely allude to positive models of what is to
be recommended. The ethics programs take on in this way a highly legalistic
character—in fact, if not in intention. Ethics programs and agencies seek meth-
ods to define and expose the public official who takes bribes, maintains financial
ties with external persons or firms, makes decisions with the goal of improving
opportunities after concluding government employment, and so forth. These are
activities whose harm can be explained in simple terms to everyone. They can be
exposed by collecting information on the financial resources of employees.
The development of high levels of virtue, character, and mind, on the other
hand, is a far more difficult task. Ethics programs seem, to be sure, to take a cer-
tain minimal notice of the larger task. OGE, when charged with developing a
code of ethics for federal employees, included references to certain kinds of ide-
alism, professionalism, and commitment that, if thought through to a conclu-
sion, certainly demand something from public officials that is more challenging
than merely avoiding conflicts of interest. But these words in the federal ethics
code are without practical influence in the ongoing work of OGE. Neither at the
federal level nor at the state level is there any serious attempt directly to foster a
high-level ethics.
How do we explain the absence of an ethics of aspiration or excellence from
the ethics reform effort? There are perhaps two main obstacles to any attempt to
foster such an ambition. First, the aim itself would conflict with a deeply
ingrained preference in liberal societies against governmental attempts to define
or promote ends. Built into the framework of liberalism from the beginning was
a demand that government confine itself toward defining a basic level of behav-
ior dealing with the most general and common needs. From Thomas Hobbes to
John Stuart Mill to the latest proponents of the morally neutral and libertarian
state, the dominant strand of liberal democratic thought has feared attempts by
government to define the aspirations of the conscience or to direct human beings
toward specific qualitative modes of conduct, belief, or aspiration. There have
been those who dissent from this view of the relationship between government
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and ethics, but they remain a minority. The preference they might have for
restoring concern for virtue or character remains today too controversial to
become a major direct objective of public policy, although it may have certain
kinds of influence indirectly. In this sense, the ethics reform program could be
said to have a very reduced and limited objective precisely as a reflection of the
dominant political culture.
Second, we can learn from one impressive attempt to consider an ethics of
aspiration or excellence that the topic is one of immense complexity that cannot
readily be made into a routine government program. Moore and Sparrow (1990)
undertook in Ethics in Government: The Moral Challenge of Public Leadership
the daunting task of careful analysis and evaluation of 10 cases of administrative
performance. Their objective in the analysis of these cases is precisely to grasp
what are the constituent elements of virtue or excellence in government work.
From their very instructive and finely crafted analyses of the cases, one can learn
that virtue in significant offices requires a very delicate balancing of often com-
peting goods, highly sensitive awareness of political and social contexts, a sense
of distinct and not necessarily harmonious obligations (to colleagues, to subor-
dinates and superiors, to the necessary processes of democratic government), an
unusual facility in asserting and maintaining leadership in often quite fluid cir-
cumstances, an ability to formulate practicable means for advancing public
interests, and a readiness for risk that is uncommon among those trained in ordi-
nary bureaucratic behavior. The ethics of virtue or excellence seems not reduci-
ble to rules and incapable of being formulated in legalistic imperatives. An eth-
ics of virtue depends on a high development of insight and character and
presupposes a high degree of political and practical sensitivity. It seems difficult
to imagine that it could be either enforced by ethics legislation or even incul-
cated by a government program in any economical fashion to large numbers of
people. Moreover, it is far from clear that we know how to foster such qualities
reliably even on a small scale. In the present context, we would emphasize
chiefly that an ethics in government law or agency will inevitably arouse higher
expectations for its work than can be satisfied. At its best, it will be a tool in
efforts at rooting out corruption. What citizens want from ethics, however, is not
only the reduction of corruption but the much higher set of qualities enabling an
official to govern well in the difficult circumstances of day-to-day public busi-
ness. For these, the ethics movement in its current version has no recipe.20
ETHICS CONTROLS VERSUS
EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE
Turning to our second point about the ethics reform movement, it is well
worth paying attention to the important thesis developed by Anechiarico and
Jacobs (1996) in The Pursuit of Absolute Integrity. Anechiarico and Jacobs trace
the development of what they call the “anti-corruption project” with particular
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reference to New York City, and they pursue the question of whether there might
not be some disproportion between the means employed to limit corruption and
the actual results achieved. A comprehensive look at anticorruption measures
such as they propose takes into account a much wider range of methods than
those employed by the federal OGE. The complete panoply includes antipatron-
age strategies, financial disclosure and conflict of interest laws, special
whistle-blower protections, distinct investigative units targeted to administra-
tive misdeeds (New York City’s Department of Investigation), the expansion of
prosecutorial authority, special contracting procedures, new techniques of
auditing and accounting, and so forth.
Anechiarico and Jacobs (1996) draw two major conclusions from this study.
They argue, first, that there is no way to measure accurately the extent of corrup-
tion. Corruption is only visible when exposed, and therefore, one can measure
convictions on corruption charges or number of investigations or the attention
given to corruption by the media, but the undetected corruption remains invisi-
ble. The result, of course, is that there is no way to ascertain whether the anticor-
ruption project has had the intended result. It is possible, and they suggest as
much, that the anticorruption project is at least partly a form of symbolic politics
conducted for the benefit of well-meaning elites dedicated to a view of govern-
ment such as the one we have found implicit in Thompson’s arguments for gov-
ernmental ethics.
Second, Anechiarico and Jacobs (1996) maintain that the anticorruption
agenda, when diligently pursued, tends to compromise administrative effi-
ciency: “the anti-corruption project exacerbates fundamental pathologies that
have always plagued bureaucracy” (p. 173). By this charge, they do not mean
that bureaucracy requires corruption or that there are inevitable inefficiencies
built into ethical behavior. Their contention is rather that the vigorous effort to
extirpate corruption leads to elaborate strategies of administrative accountabil-
ity and control that may undercut the other imperatives of effective manage-
ment. As amply illustrated by their study of the administration of New York
City, the pursuit of comprehensive defenses against corruption leads to multiple
levels of control and regulation, to meticulous supervision and review of
employees, and to defensive management techniques—in short, to the opposite
of creative, risk-taking, entrepreneurial methods of public management. They
are able to show that the reform effort has forced a weakening of administrative
authority to the detriment of decisiveness. A notable result has been to create in
New York the rather justifiable impression that public agencies are paralyzed;
an excess of accountability may in this case have undermined administrative
energy and initiative. As a consequence, public officials are tempted to resort to
adaptive strategies (privatization, use of external consultants, creation of special
authorities, use of provisional employees, etc.) to circumvent a bureaucracy
incapable of effective action. Yet these techniques for moving outside of the
bureaucracy themselves attract the attention of reformers, who demand that the
new governmental efforts be brought somehow under the umbrella of anti-
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corruption controls, raising the prospect of a new expansion of the anticorrup-
tion project.21
ETHICS AND DEMOCRATIC POLITICS
Finally, it is important to raise a question about the larger political context of
the ethics reform movement. For purposes of bringing the issue into view, let us
describe two alternatives that one might derive from the preceding. First, if
Anechiarico and Jacobs are correct, it would seem to follow that we might rec-
ognize corruption to be a common, ineradicable tendency of our political life.
One could recognize it as such, anticipate it, and plan measures to fight it with-
out generating the illusion that it will be rooted out. In this perspective, attempts
at prevention, investigation, and exposure might be seen as worthwhile within
limits but only as long as they are kept in proportion to the more important goal
of managing public business effectively. That they can and should be subordi-
nated to such a goal suggests that administration can work well even in the pres-
ence of some corruption. This orientation would mean that because other issues
are more important than ethics, ethics cannot be treated as more important than
all other issues.
An alternative view would be that implied by Thompson’s argument. The
democratic process is one that must be seen to require citizen trust in the pur-
poses of those who govern, both in the legislature and in the administrative
branch. That trust will be compromised and undermined if decision makers are
perceived to be affected by interests of their own. They must instead take meas-
ures to create a reliable appearance of detachment and disinterestedness. They
must subject themselves to the surveillance and supervision of the ethics process
as an expression of their dedication to the democratic process. To cite his para-
dox again: “Because other issues are more important than ethics, ethics is more
important than any issue” (1992, p. 255). They must regard ethics as an end in
itself, even though it is actually a means. It is an end because it is apparently the
means to the goal: Without the appearance of propriety and incorruptibility, citi-
zens in a democracy simply cannot trust their governing institutions.
There is much in our political tradition that speaks in favor of the first view.
And there is much in the accumulating experience of the ethics reform program
that suggests it is a useful one as well. American constitutional government was
never expected to arrive at the point where political decisions presuppose in all
cases the appearance of propriety, and mechanisms were not built into the insti-
tutions of government to foster such a standard. To reach back to the Founders
once again, James Madison stated in a classic way an argument for a certain nec-
essary realism in matters of ethics, an argument still useful today for grasping
why pure, disinterested fidelity to rules cannot be our sole concern in matters of
government. Madison, of course, recognized the danger of excessive self-
interest and the corruption it breeds. But he observed in The Federalist No. 51
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that it is the interior construction of government upon which we best rely for pro-
tection from the worst abuses. Madison taught his readers less to entertain hopes
for trust in governmental processes than to expect aggressive and conflicting
ambitions and to recognize that although “a dependence on the people” (i.e.,
democracy) is a primary control on the government, there will always be a
necessity for “auxiliary precautions.” These auxiliary precautions are not pri-
marily ethics programs. They are well-designed institutions, which create a
forum in which “ambition must be made to counteract ambition.” To rely on
ambition in this manner is, of course, to concede a great deal to the power of
self-interest. It indulges the desire to promote one’s own desires and fortunes
ahead of those of others and appears to recognize this tendency as inexpugnable
from political life. Can we see something positive in this view, or is it merely a
case of yielding to the weaknesses of human nature?
There is an obvious sense in which self-interest is a source of possible corrup-
tion. Yet self-interest has its positive side because it is a source of healthy ambi-
tion, and ambition is a necessary motivating force if there are to be persons and
institutions willing to exert themselves strenuously on behalf of the struggle
against corruption as well as for the other pressing tasks of government. The
ambition that checks ambition can be made to serve the cause of republican gov-
ernment, and this would seem to mean that the self-interest that forms ambition
is useful, even essential, to a republic. Ambitious self-interest is a source of both
good and bad things for a democratic republic. Self-interest rightly understood
can become a positive force in popular government, when it is properly har-
nessed for genuine public service. Self-interest, moreover, is the glue binding
representatives to their constituents. Alexander Hamilton noted in The Federal-
ist No. 35 (Hamilton, Madison, & Jay, 1982) that representatives must depend
for the continuance of their office, their “public honors,” on the “dispositions
and inclinations” (pp. 164-169) of the people. These dispositions and inclina-
tions, then and now, grow largely from their interests, and the relationship
between government and the people depends on a certain active responsiveness
to interests. The self-interest of individuals and groups may be more enlightened
or less enlightened, but it is difficult to imagine that it could be eliminated from
the operations of government, and there might be great dangers in trying. In
short, the inventors of the democratic republic saw that success would likely
emerge not from an improvement in human nature but from the managed con-
flict of self-interested individuals and groups. This was a risky proposal in its
time, but the institutions developed in that period remain the ones we employ to
govern ourselves. The risks of this system are still endemic to public life. They
require us to indulge or tolerate some human qualities that we might wish were
formed differently. At the same time, the goal of creating and sustaining a suc-
cessful democratic republic is one that should be at the heart of all projects for
improving government ethics in our time. Yet that goal may require a certain
moderation in the pursuit of ethics reform to serve more adequately the larger
political objective.
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NOTES
1. On public confidence in the integrity of government officials, see Mackey (1996, p. 59), who
cites a 1995 poll showing only 8% of those questioned had a high degree of confidence in the federal
government and only 9% a high degree of confidence in state and local government. He also notes a
recent study by the National Conference of State Legislatures that found “citizens hold legislatures
in lower esteem today than they did 10 years ago.” A recent study of anticorruption measures cites an
opinion of Norman Ornstein to the effect that an “overwhelming majority of Americans” see the
political process, and especially the Congress, as “morally bankrupt in a fashion worse than at any
time in recent memory.” In addition, the authors report a 1989 poll finding that the public believes
“one out of every three members of Congress is corrupt” (Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1996, pp. 9, 46).
See also Malec (1993).
2. Garment (1991) contends that the salience of ethics issues is highly influenced by fluctua-
tions in cultural attitudes and by the degree of attention focused on scandal by the media.
3. For an influential and quite different attempt to identify the normative principles at the heart
of the Constitution that are relevant to administrative ethics, see Rohr (1989). His account, which
stresses core regime values, identifies these as equality, liberty, and property.
4. For an interpretation of this spirit of realism, see Goldwin (1986).
5. A classic exposition of the centrality of bargaining and deal making to American democracy
is Fischer (1948). Wilson (1979) comments explicitly on Fischer’s thesis in his “American Politics,
Then and Now” and addressed the same problem in a more contemporary vein in “Democracy Needs
Pork to Survive” (1997). For a more elaborate and far-reaching account of the place accorded to eth-
ics in the American political system, see Diamond (1986).
6. The Office of Government Ethics (OGE) web site is www.usoge.gov.
7. The mandate derived from Executive Order 12674, which was issued in response to a recom-
mendation of the President’s Commission on Federal Ethics Law Reform in 1989. For an overview
of the development and value of ethics legislation, see Cooper (1998, pp. 136-153).
8. See also the Ethics Reform Act of 1989. For specific citation of all relevant statutes, see
Office of Government Ethics, 1998, pp. 9-11, 17-18, 47-50.
9. Lewis (1993, pp. 143-144) argues that federal conflict of interest statutes go back to the Civil
War but that the principle is recognized in the legislation of the first Congress establishing the Trea-
sury Department.
10. The list of those required to file the public form includes: the president and vice president and
candidates for those offices, each executive branch employee classified above GS-15, officers in the
military at O-7 or above (brigadier general or rear admiral and above), administrative law judges,
independent counsels, the postmaster general and deputy, the postal service board of governors,
employees in the executive office of the president holding a commission of appointment from the
president, and the director of OGE plus all designated agency ethics officials (OGE, 1998).
11. Rohr (1993) has, however, recently softened his views on this point. In the foreword to Fre-
derickson (1993), Rohr concedes that academics have not concerned themselves sufficiently with
“conflict of interest, financial disclosure, and the other mundane ethical questions.” These are the
“negative questions that are of tremendous importance in the careers of practitioners in our field”
(pp. xi-xii).
12. Lewis (1993) counts 4 states having ethics codes that predate 1973; 19 adopted codes from
1973 to 1979, and 5 adopted in the period from 1980 to 1988.
13. Menzel (1996) relies on the work of Lewis (1993) for his count; her source, in turn, is the
COGEL Blue Book (from 1986-1987 and 1990). See also Menzel (1993). For analysis of the ethics
laws in New York City, see Anechiarico and Jacobs (1996, pp. 48-62). Lewis (1993, p. 151) com-
ments specifically on the development of an ethics code and commission in Los Angeles, which gave
it “the most comprehensive ethics package of any city in the country.”
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14. The COGEL Blue Book (Bullock, 1993) is a useful compendium of information on the states
(and on the provinces of Canada). It is, however, dependent on the willingness of states to supply
information, and not all states participate; the 1993 edition contains data on 47 states.
15. The source of this information is the Texas Ethics Commission web site, http://www.ethics.
state.tx.us/pamphlet/whoweare.html.
16. Thompson (1995) also remarks that “half of all Americans say they believe that most mem-
bers of Congress are corrupt” (p. 1). The appearance of corruption became a central concern of the
Keating Five scandal, perhaps the most widely noted of the ethics issues recently affecting Congress
along with the Wright and Gingrich affairs. After an extensive inquiry, the Senate ethics committee
administered a formal reprimand to one senator but did not recommend more severe punishment for
wrongdoing that was tied to appearance alone. A thorough review of this affair is provided by the
Congressional Quarterly (1992, pp. 117-144) study.
17. There are some relevant minimal guidelines for Congress in the Constitution. Article I estab-
lished age, citizenship, and residency requirements. Section 5 of Article I allows each house to judge
the “elections, returns and qualifications” of its own members, and such judgments have been made
15 times in the Senate and 35 times in the House. Clause 2 of Section 5 allows each house to make its
own specific procedural rules, punish members for disorderly conduct, and upon a two thirds vote,
expel a member. The 14th Amendment forbids the election of confederate officers to Congress and
from holding any other federal or state office.
18. For details of the restrictions imposed on members of Congress by this law, see Congres-
sional Quarterly (1992, pp. 155-159).
19. Thompson is concerned as well with what he calls “mediated corruption” or “institutional
corruption.” This is a form of unethical conduct in which an individual in public office receives a
political benefit that is not in itself illegitimate but that undermines an important aspect of the demo-
cratic process. An example he used in 1993 to illustrate this type of corruption is the conduct of the
five senators who aided Charles Keating, head of the Lincoln Savings and Loan bank (Thompson,
1993). In 1995, he replaced the term mediated corruption with institutional corruption, which refers
to conduct that “undermines institutional purposes or damages the democratic process” (Thompson,
1995, pp. 6-9, 19-25).
20. There are, of course, notable efforts to study this problem. Moore and Sparrow (1990) con-
clude their book of case studies with a proposal for “an ethic of public stewardship and leadership”
(pp. 151-161). For Moore’s additional work along these lines, see Creating Public Value (Moore,
1995) as well as the work of Cooper (1991, 1999) and Rohr (1986, 1989).
21. For a thorough overview of methods for controlling public organizations, including ethics
controls, see Van Wart (1996). Van Wart draws a useful distinction between the kinds of controls that
serve as disincentives and others that, if properly designed, can serve as incentives for improved
performance.
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